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A new policy debate has arisen in Latin ?tmerfcan countries after
international investors' recent re-awakening to opportunities in emerging
markets. Two polar positions have been defined in this policy debate. On the
one hand, the "integrationists' defend financial integration on the grounds
that free market operation will always produce the best result for the
developing economy. On the other, the "isolationists" consider financial
integration dangerous for macroeconomic stability, and prefer a developing
world without market-determined international capital movements. The
regulations that limit international financial integration
center of this policy debate , as they define the degree of
integration and the distance between reality and these two
The debate is in itself surprising. An international
from only five or ten years ago would be extremely puzzled




to see that the
external financing problems that some Latin American countries are struggling
with today relate no longer to the lack, but rather to the excess, of external
financing. Colombia and Chile were denied access to external financial markets
operating on a voluntary basis during the second half of the 1980s. Many
analysts back then considered that market-based external financing was not to
be resumed anytime soon. But everything changes , and so did the lenders'
perceptions of the risk involved in holding emerging market assets. In the
mid-1990s, market-based external financing, including medium- and long-term
debt, direct investment, and portfolio investment, have been abundant for bothcountries.
In our opinion the polar positions are both to be rejected. Any
developing economy has the need for international financial integration, not
only because of the external financing needs of a rapidly growing economy, but
also because of the long term advantages that can be derived frwn financial
development, including risk diversification and the efficient provision of
financial servicen.  Despite these advantages , the immediate and complete
opening up of the capital account implies very significant potential costs
the macroeconomic stability of the developing economy. Several experiences
for
of
the negative effects of excessive spending and external indebtedness prompted
by private capital flows have already been recorded. Thus, the discussion that
has been focused in terms of the convenience or inconvenience of opening the
capital account ehould, we argue, instead be focused on the particular
strategy for international financial integration.
The approach that has been favored in both Chile and Colombia is one of
gradual and limited financial integration. Foreign exchange market regulations
and capital account intervention (including regulations) have been used to
limit the secondary effects of international financial integration and to
deter interest-rate arbitrage, destabilizing speculation, bubbles and
overshooting behavior of asset prices (including the real exchange rate). The
strategies differ in the instruments ueed and in the emphasis of policies and
objectives, but both place particular emphasis on neutralizing the
disturbances to the current account and domestic prices caused by net capital
inflows. The regulations are not exclusively based on macroeconomic policy
considerations. In addition, they also relate to the potential problems
derived from public insurance of the liabilities of financial institutions,
and the need for monitoring and limiting their risk taking. Both deposit
insurance and exchange rate guarantees may encourage over-intermediation of
international funds by banks and an increase in systemic risk, expanding
therefore the vulnerability of the banking system.*
* See Le Fort 1994 for a discussion on this subject.3
This paper describes and analyzes the policies followed in Chile and
Colombia regarding their external capital accounts during the 1990s. The
policies are analyzed and assessed in the context of the macroeconomic and
financial results obtained in the period. The first section of the paper deals
with the main analytical issues relating to international financial
integration, its costs and benefits, its implications for monetary and
exchange rate policy, and the main limitations to financial integration. The
second section of the paper describes the experience of regulated financial
integration in Chile during the 19908, including a brief historical review, a
review of the foreign exchange market regulations and the regulations on
capital movements, and the results in the capital account and at the
macroeconomic level. The third section of the paper is devoted to an analysis
of the Colombian case, including a review of the main regulations and
intervention schemes in the foreign exchange markets and the regulations for
different types of capital movements , with special emphasis on their reserve
requirement system, and the results obtained. The last section presents our
concluding remarks.
II. MAIN ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
This section analyzes some important issues relating to the integration
of the so-called emerging markets with the world's financial markets without
making reference to specific countries. To some extent, this integration is
the result of the change of views of investors regarding the risks represented
by emerging markets, and to some extent it is the result of an explicit
financial integration strategy pursued by developing countries during the
1990s. The issues discussed include the benefits and costs of financial
integration, the implications of integration for monetary and exchange rate
policy, and the policy instruments used to limit international financial
integration.
The limits imposed upon the international integration of financial
markets should not be seen as, themselves, a macroeconomic policy objective,4
but rather as instrumental to more effective monetary and exchange rate
policies. Given that these instruments have some ohortcomings,  they should be
used only to a certain extent; the need for their use arises mainly as a
result of concern about the effects of abundant external financing on the
external current account and debt positions. This concern in general relates
to the fact that large current account deficits and increasing external
indebtedness erode the country'e creditworthiness, rendering domestic
macroeconomic stability vulnerable to external financial turbulence.
fi Benefits and Cost6 of Financial Intearation .
Benefits
An open capital account has important benefits for an economy that is
developing an outward-oriented development strategy, characterized by the
growth of the sectors in which the country has comparative advantage. In
principle, and perhaps oversimplifying, it can be said that the opening up of
the capital account can be associated with two types of benefits:
(i) DevelopPent of the financial services sector: A developing economy
may have comparative advantage in the production of financial services; if
that is the case, an export sector would develop after the elimination of
restrictions to international financial integration. However, it is also
possible that foreign competition may take control of this industry, and the
country may become a net importer of financial services. In any case,
international integration would imply lower costs and better quality for users
of'financial services. Financial integration then allows for a reduced cost of
capital and more efficiently provided financial services to help in the
intertemporal stabilization of coneumption.
(ii) Integration allows for a greater diversification of the asset
portfolio of domestic economic agents, by making the composition of domestic
portfolios independent of the composition of domestic production. In a
financially closed economy, the composition of domestic asset portfolios tends




securities that derive returns from external productive
are independent from those of domestic activities allow for
income stability through greater diversification. Income of
domestic residents becomes more stable to the extent that their portfolios
include assets that derive their returns from activities more or less
independent from domestic exports. Such diversification may be umed to
compensate for the (often great) volatility of national income that affects
open economies due to the variability of individual export prices.
costs
Financial openness also, however, poses several costs, some of which are
only valid during the transition to a fully integrated economy. Among these
costs can be distinguished:
(i) Transitional costs: One way of looking at the process of financial
integration is that it constitutes a way to overcome a stock imbalance.
Financial liberalization allows stock adjustments, directing capital towards
regions where the expected profitability of capital is greatest, or to where
opportunities exist for risk diversification at a reasonable cost in terms of
profitability. It is clear that in countries like Chile and Colombia, the
returns to capital are typically higher than in the developed world, a
condition that stimulates foreigners to invest and finance investments in
them. Full integration implies a jump in asset prices within a relatively
short period of time, and a massive inflow of foreign capital that lasts until
the stock adjustment is completed and risk-adjusted domestic rates of return
converge to the
short period of
l I of rapid growth
levels of foreign rates. This process, if it takes place in a
time, can be a source of macroeconomic imbalances in the form
in investment, wealth and consumption, real currency
appreciation, inflationary pressures and a widening current account deficit.
It can create destabilizing wealth and expenditure effects, resulting in
confusing signals to domestic consumers with detrimental effects on domestic
savings, exchange rate stability and the stability of the growth process.6
(ii) Polfc&,g:, In a financially open economy monetary
its ability to affect domestic macroeconomic conditions without
policy loses
modifying the
external balance. In general , an increase in the real interest rate directed
at controlling inflationary pressures will also result in an exchange rate
appreciation, both of the nominal and real rates. The appreciation helps in
reducing inflation, but may generate a larger current account deficit. In
fact, under some conditions, in a financially open economy monetary
authorities may be forced to choose between the inflationary target or the
external balance objective. It is true that a tighter fiscal policy may be
used in place of monetary restraint under these circumstances; however, real
world fiscal policies lack the flexibility needed for short- or medium-term
stabilization, particularly when the fiscal accounts are already in balance or
in surplus.
(iii) peal costs: Financial integration leaves the economy exposed to
the turbulence of international capital markets, adding a risk factor and
volatility to the exchange market which may affect macroeconomic balances.
International capital markets can move very rapidly and almost without warning
signals, from an optimistic lending phase in which funds are abundant and
relatively cheap, to a pessimistic phase in which funds are not available and
a sharp adjustment is forced. The recent case of Mexico and that of most Latin
American countries in the 19808 come to mind in this respect.
(iv) Svstemfc risk costs: Economic agents tend to perceive the existence
of publicly provided insurance to liabilities of financial institutions and
institutional investors, whether or not it has been explicitly offered. This
implicit or explicit insurance requires regulations that limit risk taking by ’
4.
those institutions. Full and unrestricted international financial integration
allows portfolio selection from a wider set of assets, making it more
difficult to control and monitor their risk-taking.7
. Financial Intearation. and Monetarv and Exchanae Rate Policv
The perceptions of foreign investors of the risk and returns from
investment in the Chilean and Colombian economies have changed significantly
following institutional changes and the success of macroeconomic policy. This
change has resulted in a very significant reduction in the risk premium
demanded by investors in these countries , which in turn has resulted in
sizable capital inflows that have modified the degree of integration of the
domestic financial markets into the corresponding international markets. It
can be said that in economies like Chile and Colombia, the risk-adjusted
marginal efficiency of capital has increased to levels above those prevailing
in the developed world. As a result, capital tends to move into these
economies, reducing the domestic cost of capital and increasing the prices of
domestic assets.
Financial integration implies that the*integrating  economy is fully open
to financial arbitrage. Consequently domestic real interest rates are forced
to reflect the external real interest rate and a country risk premium. Any
deviation from this requirement of risk-adjusted international interest rate
equalization implies changes in the opposite direction in the real exchange
rate.3 However, the domestic interest rates required to generate domestic
macroeconomic equilibrium may be higher than the rates forced by international
arbitrage. In these conditions, when domestic interest rates are increased, in
addition to the standard closed economy response in terms of a lower expansion
of domestic expenditure, in the financially open economy, a real appreciation
of the domestic currency takes place. The real exchange rate adjustment shifts
demand towards the rest of the world, alleviating pressure on domestic output
a* but also increasing the current account deficit.
The size and duration of the arbitrage effect of the domestic interest
rate change on the real exchange rate depend on, among other factors, the
horizon of planning of arbitrageurs and on the expected duration of the new
3 Throughout this paper we use the Latin American definition of the real
exchange rate (RRR); that is, the RRR increases when the domestic currency
depreciates in real terms.a
interest rate differential. The shorter their horizon, the lower the impact on
the real exchange rate. It also depends upon the effect on the country risk
premium of the exchange rate appreciation. If the increase in the country risk
premium brought about by the real appreciation of the currency is significant,
then the impact on the exchange rate is minimized.
International arbitrage may imply that the real exchange rate becomes
and remains, for significant periods of time, out of line with respect to the
authorities' external equilibrium objective. Consequently, the current account
deficit may exceed, on a medium-term basis , what is sustainable over a longer
term, rendering the economy vulnerable to a forced external adjustment. This
adjustment is triggered if external creditors no longer consider it safe to
continue lending to an addictive borrower. The market's automatic correction
mechanism is the effect of the larger current account deficit on the country
risk premium and on expectations of currency depreciation. If larger deficits
make the market participants uneasy, then this by itself should stop or even
reverse the capital inflows and thus correct the real exchange rate. However,
it seems that market participants are not always very sensitive to this risk,
and that they typically only react when it is too late, after the external
conditions have worsened so much that a very large and
expenditure adjustment is needed.&
painful domestic
A first policy response to the real appreciation of the currency is to
try to compensate for the effect of capital inflows on the exchange rate. This
has been done through the intervention of the monetary authority in the
foreign exchange market. However the purchaee of foreign exchange by the
, Central Bank has thereby become the main source of domestic liquidity
.
creation. To limit the effects of exchange market intervention on monetary
conditions, the Central Banks have used different forms of sterilization,
including the sale of bills or forcing the temporary holding of foreign
' Experiences of the lack of sensitivity of market participants in the face
of large external indebtedness include the Mexican crisis of the 1990s and the
Chilean financial crisis of the 1980s. In both cases, financing was abundant up
to a point at which a large adjustment was needed. (See Arellano, 1983; Budnevich
and Cifuentes, 1983.)9
currency certificates. Xowever, this sterilization is costly for the Central
Bank and losses arise from the international interest rate differential and
the real currency appreciation: the Central Bank acquires assets that yield
the international interest rate and that depreciate in real terms, while
having to issue liabilities that pay the higher domestic interest rate and
keep their real value. As a transitory mechanism, sterilized intervention
works; however, on a longer-term basis, its effectiveness is impaired by the
resulting financial losses.
A second alternative is to reduce the domestic interest rate. However,
this reduction would create an increase in domestic expenditure that would put
pressure on the price level, force a real currency appreciation and increase
the current account deficit. An obvious solution is to reduce the interest
rate and at the same time compensate for the effect on expenditure via a
tighter fiscal policy. An austere fiscal policy directed at controlling the
expansion of aggregate expenditure, limiting both public and private
expenditure expansion, is a must for the final success of any stabilization
effort. However, there are political limits to what fiscal policy can deliver,
and thus restrictions or limitations to international financial integration
may be required to preserve macroeconomic stability.
It is generally suggested that another way to compensate for capital
inflows is by opening the economy to capital outflows, allowing domestic
residents, firms, and financial institutions to hold assets abroad. Although a
valid tool to favor the diversification of domestic portfolios, this is not
effective as a tool to reduce net capital inflows. As domestic residents
increase their holdings of foreign assete, they reduce the demand for domestic
assets that they would otherwise be exercising. A lower demand for domestic
assets, "ceteris paribue", is reflected in lower asset prices and higher asset
returns, which act as additional attraction to foreign capital inflows.
Furthermore, facilitating capital outflows reduces the risks faced by foreign10
investors by making easier the exit. (See Lab&n and LarraSn, 1993.)s
Limitations on international financial integration give additional
degrees of freedom to monetary and exchange rate policies, allowing
adjustments in domestic interest rates that cannot be arbitraged to the
exchange rate. In practice, these restrictions give room for the use of
monetary policy to gradually reduce domestic inflation, while keeping the
current account deficit at reasonable levels.
The problem created by capital inflows for the effectiveness of monetary
policy is better dealt with by a flexible exchange rate. In this connection,
exchange rate stability is costly because it facilitates the international
arbitrage of interest rates. If the Central Bank tries to actively provide
exchange rate stability, it faces additional cost5 in terms of higher reserve
purchases, and at the end is forced to accept a more appreciated currency. In
this sense, avoiding rules for official intervention, increasing the width of
the exchange rate band, and using a basket of currencies rather than a single
currency to peg the reference rate are measures that increase the
effectiveness of monetary policy, by helping to insulate against excessive
capital inflows. The ex ante volatility of the exchange rate also tends to
deter short-run capital inflows as it removes exchange rate "guarantees" and
thus helps to support a higher real exchange rate.6
$!. Limitations to Financial Intearatioq
In order to reduce the need for sterilized intervention, several
limitations to international financial integration have been used. These
restrictions, by limiting the possibilities of financial arbitrage, have given
: some room for the opszation of monetary policy as it seeks to achieve domestic
macro balance. In most cases the restrictions to capital transactions
5 Institutional investors and banks are subject to regulations and
supervision of their investment5 because of the systemic risk and public
insurance problem. These restrictions are not related to the regulation of
capital flow5 to preserve macroeconomic stability.
6 This point is developed in 0. Sanhueta, 1995.11
introduce registration procedures for international capital transactions.
These procedures can be important sources of information for measuring the
external accounts, and also for the
obvious administrative costs.
The first type of restriction
markets. One market, the formal, is
tax authorities; but they also involve
is the use of dual foreign exchange
used for current account transactions and
authorized capital flows, and the other, the informal, is used for other
financial flows. In this scheme, financial arbitrage takes place in the
informal market, permitting this secondary exchange rate to deviate from the
authorities' target rate. Since the formal market is not subject to arbitrage,
the current account is isolated from exchange rate volatility. During the days
of scarce foreign financing, the informal rate reflected a more depreciated
domestic currency than the rate in the formal market. The opposite should be
the case under abundant external flows.
The dual exchange rate scheme has one serious shortcoming -- the
existence of leaks that allow for arbitraging the differential between the
exchange rates in the two markets. These leaks not only render the exchange
restrictions ineffective, creating pressure towards the equalization of the
exchange rates, but also imply significant costs. The leaks include the over-
and under-invoicing of current account flows , and they tend to increase in
importance as the absolute value of the premium becomes larger. The leaks, in
general, result in quasi-fiscal losses and transfer of resources from the
Central Bank to those agents that discover ways to buy foreign exchange in one
market and sell it in the other at a premium. Additional costs of the leaks
are the regulations and administrative costs incurred in the effort of
' preventing them.
A second type of restriction is the imposition of reserve requirements
or other more direct measures that increase the marginal cost of external
financing. The reserve requirements increase the cost of foreign financing
since they demand the use of additional resources to finance the required
deposit in the Central Bank. The reserve requirements may relate to all forms12
of foreign financial flows; however, in practice, they have not generally
affected direct investment and other forms of equity financing, suppliers'
credits on imports, or advanced export returns.'
In general, the financial cost effects of the reserve requirements tend
to be stronger for short-term financing and therefore work particularly
against short-term arbitrage. In Chile, the required reserves must all be kept
in the Central Bank for a period of one year, diminishing the relative
financial burden for longer-term operations. In the case of Colombia, however,
the requirement is variable depending on the maturity of the loan; for longer
maturities the reserve requirement ratio (RR) is lower, implying
discrimination against short-term inflows.
Mechanisms like the reserve requirements have certain limitations.
First, they can be avoided by using vehicles that are not affected by the
requirement; for example, accelerated export returns, supplier credita, or
equity investments. There is a limitation, however, on what can be brought in
through these alternative vehicles. The requirements can also be evaded by not
registering capital flows, although penalties may be imposed on those who
evade the regulations.
The reserve requirements are effective only under expectations of real
exchange rate stability, and thus are unable to stop a speculative attack
created by expectations of exchange rate adjustments. The capital gains that
can be made with a discrete exchange rate jump cannot be sufficiently reduced
by the financial cost of the reserve requirement. This implies that, despite
the reserve requirement, only exchange rates that are consistent with market
expectations can be successfully defended. The equilibrium trend of the
exchange rate, even if it represents a significant real appreciation of the
currency, cannot be influenced by such policies. An exchange rate adjustment
can be spread more over time, but only to a certain extent. The reserve
requirements as well as the other restrictions to financial integration
7 An exception to this rule is the reserve requirement imposed on secondary
ADR inflows in Chile.13
increase financing costs for individuals and firms, limit business
opportunities for the financial sector , and reduce portfolio diversification
for domestic agenta. They also affect the equity-debt mix, and create
financial segmentation that tends to favor big over small enterprises, and to
encourage informal means of financing. They are thus not free of private and
social coot*.
Other types of restriction6 affect the ability of domestic firms and
financial institutions to issue debt or stock in international capital
markets. These restrictions can take the form of discretional authorization or
of conditions like a minimum credit rating, minimum amount issued, or others.
In this respect the purpose of the restrictions ia not only related to
limiting the external capital inflows but also to screening the companies that
are authorized to participate in international capital markets. Since the
actions of each firm generate externalities to others, in the sense that all
of them are seen as firms belonging to a particular country, some type of
screening process is required.
Finally, restrictions may be applied to portfolio investors from abroad
in the form of quantitative restrictions on entry into domestic markets, or
minimum stay (or permanence) requirements.
Restrictions on international financial integration are effective to a
certain extent but could not be considered a cure-all or a way to completely
isolate the domestic economy from the realities of the international financial
markets. There are always ways to circumvent the restrictions, ways that tend
to be reinforced the larger is the risk-adjusted interest rate differential.
Consequently, only to a certain extent is it possible to use these
restrictions to give some room for manoeuvre to domestic monetary policy.14
III. REGULATED FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN CXILE
During the 19906, important policy measures have been taken to regulate
the financial integration of the Chilean economy with international markets.
These measures, together with the recognition of the Chilean economy in
financial centers, have allowed for increasing financial integration and for
important  changes in the composition of Chilean capital flows during the
1990s. The foreign exchange market and capital flows regulations existing in
the Chilean economy are briefly reviewed in this section. In addition the
results derived from this strategy are presented.8
The regulations are directed to reducing potential effects on
macroeconomic stability, increasing the effectiveness of monetary policy, and
imposing prudential regulations on banks and institutional investors. They
have taken the form of exchange market regulations , capital flows regulations
and other related policies.
A. Brief Nistorv of ReadatiOnS
Financial activity, which had been repressed for years by negative real
rates of interest and administrative allocation of credit, and with the
majority of financial institutions under government control, entered an
accelerated liberalization process in the 1970s. After decades of financial
repression, the supervisory institutions lacked the experience necessary to
impose prudential regulations effectively. The result was a financial system
with insufficient capitalization, that went into bankruptcy in the early
1980s. A deep recession, beginning at the end of 1981, eroded the solvency of
financial institutions which were in a very vulnerable position. The trigger .
4
for the crisis was a sharp
deterioration of the terms
expenditure. The financial
the beginning of 1983.
reduction in external capital inflows and a
of trade, causing a sharp adjustment in domestic
crisis spread throughout the financial system by
a For a complete description of the regulations and capital account results
in Chile in the 19908, see Le Fort and Varela, 1995.The volatility of international capital flow5 played a very important
role in setting off the cridrr. A significant proportion of capital flow5
entering the country in the period prior to the 1982 crisis was intermediated
15
by the financial system. The removal of restrictions to capital inflows, when
domestic interest rates, duly adjusted for exchange risk, widely exceeded
international rates, generated a massive capital inflow which financed a
strong expansion of domestic spending. The external debt problems provoked a
drastic change in the direction of capital flows, forcing an adjustment and
contributing to the deepening of the criefs of the financial system.
The financial institutions recovered from the crisis in the second half
of the 1980s. After their experience, a macroeconomic policy characterized by
caution and a concern to control the expansion of expenditure has resulted,
during the 19905, in moderate current account deficits. Macroeconomic policy
has defined a target range for the medium-term current account deficit of
between 30 and 4% of GDP. External financing has more than exceeded financing
requirements, resulting in significant increases in international reserves. As
a result of balance of payments flows alone, international reserves increased
by almost US$ 10 billion in the period 1990-1995, reaching a level of around
US$ 14 billion by the end of that period despite the pre-payment of public
external debt of about USS 1.5 billion.
The policy of external financial opening pursued by the Chilean
authorities in the 1990s is characterized by the maintenance of a series of
regulations which affect the foreign exchange market and the capital account,
and limit the degree of integration of external and domestic markets.
8. Foreiun Exchancre Market Recrulations and Interv B entio
During the 1990s the Chilean foreign exchange market has evolved from a
dual market to an increasingly unified market. The formal foreign exchange
market is affected by regulations and access restrictions, while the informal
foreign exchange market is fully liberalized. Total unification has not been
achieved yet, but the exchange rate differential in both markets is almostnon-existent -- less than a 0.5% difference on average in 1995. The dual
exchange market was conceived as a way to isolate the formal market exchange
rate -- the one at which trade flows were carried out -- from the volatility
16
of capital flows, particularly portfolio outflows that must be carried out
through the informal exchange market. Over time, however, the duality has lost
relevance since the risk of portfolio outflows has almost vanished.
Some transactions must be effected through the formal market: in
particular, all foreign portfolio capital inflows must be processed through
the formal market. Investors and borrowers obtain, in exchange, the right to
access the same market at the time of servicing the debt or remitting profits
or capital. Other capital outflows, including foreign direct investment and
portfolio investment by residents, cannot be carried out through the formal
market. Finally, there are transactions
the two exchange markets. These include
factor services.
that can be carried out in either of
exports and imports of goods and non-
The dual exchange market approach has been gradually revised. Increasing
confidence has allowed the reduction of exchange restrictions, particularly
those affecting export proceeds. In several steps, the export surrender
requirements were first reduced and then, from June 16, 1995, completely
eliminated. The exchange market regulations that remain in place are mostly
related to capital flows, and can be considered complementary to the
regulation of foreign exchange market flows.
The formal foreign exchange market operates under a managed float within
an exchange rate band. Central Bank intervention is directed to maintaining
the nominal and, through it, the real exchange rate within a range consistent
.
’ with a sustainable current account position. In an indexed economy like that
of Chile, changes in the nominal rate only affect the level of the real
exchange rate for a limited time. It is understood that the real exchange rate
cannot be permanently affected through the nominal rate and that it is
necessary to create adequate conditions in terms of real variables to attain
that result.17
By "external equilibrium" the authorities understand the maintenance
a deficit in the current account of the balance of payments, which, while
allowing the use of a reasonable amount of external saving for financing
domestic investment, still ensures that the increase in external debt is
compatible with the long-term growth of the Chilean economy without
introducing a significant source of further external vulnerability for the
country. In practice, this
3% to 4% of GDP. Obviously
any given year the current
from the average.
means a deficit on current account of the order of
this target is interpreted as an average since in
account deficit must be permitted some divergence
Since the market has been at, or close to the more appreciated end of
of
the exchange rate band, the Central Bank, as noted above, has accumulated a
significant amount of net international reserves , while a significant portion
of the external public debt has been pre-paid. The monetary impact of official
intervention in foreign exchange markets has been sterilized through the
issuance of Central Bank debt.
C. Recfulatione on Caoital Uovemente
The regulation of capital movements differentiates between direct
investment and debt flows. Direct investment is favored due to the assumed
positive externalities associated with foreign investment, including access to
international markets and the transfer of management techniques and
technology. As a consequence, the direct investment regime is fairly liberal,
while the regulations are directed to limit foreign indebtedness, particularly
that of a short-term nature. The only important restriction for direct
investment is the one-year minimum stay. Portfolio investment through ADRs
placed in New York is limited by credit rating and minimum amount conditions.
pfrect investment inflows9
Direct investment is subject to a minimum stay of one year for the
9 Deere Law 600 (DL-600), and Chapters XIX and XIV of the Central Bank
Foreign Exchange Regulations (CBFXR).18
principal. Profite, with the single exception of investment performed through
debt conversions, are not subject to time limitations. The rules that allowed
for foreign investment through debt conversions were eliminated in mid-1995.
portfolio investment inflows, ADRs'O
Procedures relating to bonds and American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) --




limits on the right to issue these types of instrument in
amount and risk classification. Initially the minimum amount
issuing of non-financial firms' ADRs was U88 50 million. From
September 1994 this was reduced to US9 25 million. At the same time it was
decided to reduce the issuers' long-term debt risk rating to BBB or better for
non-financial companies, and to BBB+ or better for banking institutions. This
rating has to be granted by three internationally-recognized risk-rating
agencies.
Beginning in July 1995, the secondary ADR inflows are subject to the 30%
reserve requirement that relates to most forms of foreign indebtedness. In
addition, in November 1995, and for those companies that have at least one
previous issue, the minimum amount for primary issues of ADRS (not subject to
the RR) was reduced to USS 10 million. A condition imposed on the new primary
issues is that all previous issues of the same company become subject to the
ssme regulations as the last issue.
Other oortfolio caoital inflows
Regulations on debt-related capital flows and on deposits of non-
residents are tighter. Instead of minimum stay or credit rating requirements,
these types of flows are influenced by a reserve requirement. The purpose of
.
’ the reserve requirement is to increase the cost of external financing, and
consequently increase the level of the domestic interest rate at which
international arbitrage results in external inflows. At present, the reserve
requirement ratio is 30% of the value of the loan, bond or deposit, and the
reserve deposit must be placed at the Central Bank in US dollars.
lo Chapter XXVI of the CBFER.19
&oans and bonde"
External loans and bonds issued abroad are subject to a 30% reserve
requirement, to be kept in the Central Bank for a period of one year,
irrespective of the maturity of the loan or bond. In all cases, the reserve
deposit must be constituted in US dollars; however, an alternative to the
deponft is the payment, in advance, of the financial cost implied by the
reserve requirement. In addition, bonds are subject to regulations similar to
those,that affect ADRs. There is a minimum amount of bonds to be issued, US$
25 million for corporate bond emissions , and a minimum risk rating of BBB for
non-financial issuers and BBB+ for banks.
penosfts and credit lines"
External credit lines, used mainly to finance trade operations, are also
subject to the 30% reserve requirement which is applied on the average balance
of the month. Similar is the case of foreign currency deposits. Foreign
currency deposits and placements in foreign currency are also subject to the
reserve deposit of 308, applied on the average balance of the month.
Canital outflows
With respect to the acquisition of foreign assets by Chilean residents,
regulations are rather liberal with the sole exception of prudential
restrictions imposed on banks and institutional investors.
Foreian investment bv the Chilean non-financial orivate sector13
Foreign investments carried out by individuals and by non-financial
companies are not in practice subject to any restrictions. The only limitation
is related to access to the formal foreign exchange market, which ia not
always granted. In any case the informal market is readily available at a rate
roughly the same as in the formal market. (The spread between the two markets
averaged leee than 0.11 during 1995.) This measure haB greatly facilitated
" Chapter XIV of the CBFXR.
I2 Chapters III and XIII of the CBFXR.
l3 Chapter XII of the CBFRR..’
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Chilean investment abroad, which has also enjoyed a notable boom since 1990.
Chilean investment abroad is concentrated mainly in the financial services,
electrical, and transportation and telecommunications sectors.
Poreian investments of Chilean institutional inveators14
Foreign investments by pension funds , mutual funds and life insurance
companies are subject to certain limits as to the amounts and types of foreign
assets that they can hold. These restrictions were recently upgraded by the
Central Bank after the approval by Congress of a new capital market law.
Pension funds are authorized to hold up to 9% of their total funds in foreign
assets, which may include a variety of fixed-income assets and company shares;
the latter are limited to 4.5% of the fund. Life insurance companies are
limited to investments of up to 10% of their funds in foreign assets. The
limit on general insurance companies is 15% of their reserves, and for mutual
funds the limit is 301 of the fund.
J’oreian investments bv banks
Regulations on foreign asset holdings by cormaercial  banks are associated
with the problem of systemic risk and deposit insurance affecting the banking
system. Foreign financial investments by commercial banks are limited to 25%
of the bank capital and reserves , and restricted to bills and bonds issued or
guaranteed by foreign governments or Central Banks. Banks are also authorized
to use foreign currency deposits and credit lines to finance trade within the
Association for Latin American Integration (ALADI). In addition, commercial
banks can acquire stock of foreign banks or establish branches abroad provided
that the domestic banks have a capital adequacy index of 10%  or more. (This
index, based on the Baele Convention, measures capital as a proportion of the
value of total assets adjusted by credit risk.) Only to the extent that bank
supervision can be effective in monitoring the risk of foreign assets is
further liberalization possible in this area.
p. Canital Account and Macroeconomic Results
I4 Chapter XXVI of the CBPER.21
The international perception of the reduction of the risk of Chilean
investment is reflected in several indicators. The investment grade rating
Chilean public debt, equivalent to S&P’8 (A-), which ie given by the met
prestigioue international agencies, i8 the highest in Latin America and
for
comparable to that of some countries in Southern Europe and South East Asia.
The reduction in the international perception of risk in the Chilean
economy has resulted in a substantial increase in the supply of external fund8
available for the country. Net capital inflow8 have been significant over the
last five years, averaging 6.6% of GDP over the period 1990-94, with a maximum
of 9.4% of GDP in 1990. With a current account deficit averaging only 1.5% of
GDP, the available external financing has been more than necessary or desired
and, a8 a result, Central Bank net international reserve8 increased markedly,
by about 10 billion dollars , to a level equivalent to 26% of GDP and more than
one year of imports by the end of 1995 (8ee'Table 1).
One question that has been asked ie whether under these circumstance8
the existing capital account regulations have been effective. Particularly the
reserve requirement has been under scrutiny. Certainly, if effectiveness
includes stopping capital flows, the regulation8 are not effective since they
have continued at a significant pace. However the effectiveness of regulations
should be measured only in terms of their objectivee,  which do not include
drying up the capital account. The first objective is to favor equity over
debt financing and long-term financing over ehort-term financing. The second
is to allow the operation of a tight monetary policy without resulting in
large current account imbalances.
A8 a conseguence of the capital account regulations, a significant
change in the composition of the capital account occurred in the 19908.
Foreign direct investment and longer-term portfolio investment (associated
mainly with the placement of ADRs) grew in importance relative to external
indebtedness. Indeed, net foreign investment plus portfolio investment grew
from about 3% of GDP in 1990 and 1.2% of GDP in 1991, to 2.5% in 1993 and 4%22
in 1994.15 In recent years there has also been a change in the composition of
external borrowing, with a trend towards more debt of medium and long term and
a consequent reduction in external short-term financing. In fact, in 1990
external short-term debt financing smounted to 4.6% of GDP, while in 1994
short-term financing was equivalent to 2.4% of GDP (see Table 3).
Monetary policy has been tight, with the short-term real interest rates
averaging 6% per annum while the annual inflation rate has fallen from almost
30% in 1990 to 9% in 1994. Inflation reduction has been based on the control
of expenditure expansion. Expenditure control has paid off not only in terms
of low inflation but also in that the current account deficit has averaged
less than 2% of GDP over the 1990s. The expenditure control has been achieved
through high interest rates, higher than the standards in the developed world.
This result would not have been possible if capital account regulations had
not been effective, because under such circumstances capital inflows would
have made it impossible to keep rates above international levels (see Table
4).
At the same time, the economy has been growing at an average rate of
6.5% per year during the 19908, with exports leading the expansion. It is
possible to conclude that reserve requirements have been effective in limiting
the international integration of fixed-income markets. The international
interest rate differential would not have been possible without this type of
restriction. Longer-term markets show, Px ante, a similar spread as short-term
markets. The explanation seems to be that for longer terms the insurance
premium against country risk is higher, thus offsetting the.lower financial
effect of the reserve requirement.
At the same time an important segment of the Chilean equity market has
been effectively integrated with international stock markets through the ADRs.
However, the risks associated with the price of each particular stock, or even
" If we exclude from total foreign investments those performed through
external debt instruments, the change in the composition is still more
significant. Net foreign investments as a percentage of net capital inflows rises
from 20% in 1990 to 44% in 1994. The remainder is external borrowing which falls
from 80% to 56% in the same period.23
with an index of them, make it very difficult to perform international
financial arbitrage through this mechanism.
It ia important to note that the reserve requirement cannot be used to
avoid a trend of real appreciation of the domestic currency. Indeed in Chile
the real effective exchange rate ham shown mn appreciating trend averaging 4%
per year during the lmmt five years. The currency appreciation trend ham been
an equilibrium trend, in the sense that it ham been consistent with a
sustainable deficit in the current account of the balance of payments of less
than 2% of GDP. In the face of expectations of currency appreciation, the
reserve requirement is ineffective in stopping capital inflows. The financial
cost implied by the requirement, 2 or 3 percentage
easily offset by an expected appreciation of 1% or
weeks.
points per annum, can be
2% in the following few
Domestic financial indicators show that the capital account regulations
have not resulted in M impaired financial symtem. In fact, despite the
regulations, the financial system and the capital markets have achieved very
significant development in Chile over the last few years. The rapid
development of the banking system is shown in the expansion of the total
liabilities of the financial system to the private sector (M7), which have
increased from 474 of GDP in 1990 to 674 of GDP in 1995. At the mmme time, the
real rate of return on capital of domestic banks ham been kept at a high  and
stable level. On average, between 1990 and 1994 commercial banks earned 209,
in real terms, on their capital and remervem.
The results in the stock market are even more remarkable. On average,
the stock market index measured in USS dollar terms increased 40% per year in
the period from December 1989 to December 1995. A8 a consequence, total stock
market capitalization towards the end of 1995 increased to the equivalent of
125% of GDP, compared with 504 of GDP in 1990.
IV. CAPITAL ACCOUNT AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY IN COLOMBIA
During the first half of the 19908, the Colombian economy was engaged in24
a wide-reaching program of structural reform. The
of the economy to international trade through the
prograzi included the opening
elimination of
administrative restrictions to imports and a generalized reduction of tariffs;
the subscription to bilateral international trade agreements with Venezuela,
Xexico and Chile; the creation of a Ministry of Foreign Exchange and a Foreign
Commerce Bank; the introduction of measures increasing the flexibility of the
exchange rate; the enhancement of possibilities to acquire external financing
for national agents; the removal of restrictions on external investment and
the establishment of national treatment for foreign investors; the reduction
of the overall taxation rate; labor market liberalization and privatization of
part of the social security system; privatization of some public enterprises;
and the reform of the central bank charter to grant it legal independence.
A . Exchanae Rate Reuime and SterilizatioR
Since the end of the 19706, Colombia had used a crawling peg exchange
rate regime. The Banco de la Reptiblica (BR), Colombia's Central Bank, has made
a daily announcement of the rate at which the bank was willing to engage in
foreign exchange transactions. Towards the mid-19808, the rate of currency
devaluation had consistently lagged behind inflation rate differentials,
resulting in a sustained real appreciation. The BR response was an
acceleration of the devaluation program , even above the inflation rate
differential, improving competitiveness at the cost of higher inflation.16
In 1991, the BR was granted political independence through a
constitutional reform. The new Central Bank charter formally established a
commitment to the reduction of inflation. In a context of stubborn
' inflationary pressures and a tendency to currency appreciation, the BR
reformed the exchange rate regime, introducing exchange certificates (EC),
aiming at a more flexible and market oriented exchange rate. In this way, the
l6 According to Carrasguilla, macroeconomic policy never sought explicitly
the reduction of inflation since it constituted an important source of resources
for the public sector, characterizing what he calls an accommodative exchange
rate policy.25
first foraml exchange market in many years was established.
The scope for using sterilization policy hinges on the cross-border
mobility of capital. As benefits , one can mention the recovery of monetary
control and the avoidance of excessive intermediation through the banking
system without increasing intermediation costs, as happens with the reserve
requirement. Among the associated costs, it is worth mentioning that monetary
sterilization has implied an increase in interest rates and an increase in the
quasi fiscal deficit.
The intervention mechanism in Colombia combined, in the same
transaction, exchange market intervention and sterilization. The Central Bank
purchased foreign exchange with EC8 , a dollar-denominated financial instrument
issued by the BR that initially was redeemable at the BR in pesos at full
value and on demand. The redemption price, in pesos, of these instruments was
determined daily by the Central Bank, and
price at the maturity date. This price is
called "the representative rate".
corresponded to its liquidation
similar to the exchange rate and was
From June of 1991, the EC8 maturity term was extended first to three
months and then, in October, to one year. These financial instruments could be
sold at a discount in the secondary market , and the Central Bank opened a
discount window to redeem EC8 at 0.875 of their value, a discount of 12.5%.
Foreign exchange was sold to the BR in exchange for the  EC8 at a rate fixed by
the Central Bank, the exchange certificate redemption rate (ER). The ER itself
continued to operate in a crawling peg fashion but now a gap was generated
with respect to the market rate. This gap was fundamentally determined by
domestic interest rates (since the EC8 were substitutes for other peso-
. denominated financial assets) and the expected rate of devaluation of the
official exchange rate (ER). When interest rates rose, the gap became larger,
and the market rate appreciated , converging to the exchange rate
was 0.875 (ER), the value at which the BR bought back new ECs.
The nominal value at time T of an "EC-dollar" was equal to




date of T+l, which claims the right to 1 dollar, and is bounded by the
discount price at which it can be sold to the BR (the floor), must be




and the opportunity cost given by the interest rate of peso-denominated
ieeued by the BR. The price in pee08 could be written ae:
--
The floor price ie determined by the BR, which buy8 an aEC-dollarw  at a
discount of 12.5% of the official exchange rate (ER):
Puddlar =0.875 E,R,
If the foreign-exchange market work8 efficiently, the EC price ehould
correspond to the market exchange rate which depend8 positively on the level
of the official exchange rate (ER), its rate of expected devaluation, and
negatively on the interest rate.
The EC8 tied the BR hands in the conduct of its monetary policy. If the
BR raised fntereet rates through open market operations, the market exchange
rate (the price in pee00 of the EC dollar) would be pushed to the floor, and
intermediaries would liquidate their EC stocks. A8 the stock of EC8 in the
market fell, the monetary stock would rfee eliminating the initial interest
rate rise, unless sterilization with peso-denominated debt was practiced. The
system operated practically as a pseudo flotation-band, given that by
arbitrage the




market price could never fall below what we have called the
market rate rose above the ER, agent8 would lower their stock of
equivalent to buying dollar8 from the BR to eel1 them to the
the crawling-peg years, monetary sterilization had been
performed through open-market operations. The introduction of EC8 was done
with the objective of eliminating the need for euch sterilization, or27
performing it directly in the exchange market. The system was of very limited
effectiveness. As long as market operators accumulated EC stocks, the flow of
dollars going into the market and hence central bank intervention  were
reduced. At the point when the flow of EC liquidations was equal to the
issuance of new certificates, however, the sterilization effect of EC was
nullified. The attempts at forcing an increase in the EC stock through longer
maturity for the EC
In January of
band of f15% around
were bound to fail."
1994, the EC system was discontinued, and an exchange rate
a central parity entered into operation. The Central Bank
intervened, within the band, in both the spot and future exchange markets. The
BR announced daily the central parity rate for the next 10 days, and the rate
of devaluation of the central parity was initially set at 11%. Parallel to the
band, the BR established a "monetary corridor", that is a band for Ml which
the BR is committed to maintain through operations in its peso-denominated
debt. In December 1994, and as the market rate put pressure on the band, the
band's central rate was appreciated by 7%. As a compensation the rate of
subsequent devaluation of the central parity was increased to 13.5%.
p. Foreicm Exchanue Restrictions and Public Debt Policv
In 1991 a fomal foreign exchange market was created, substituting for
the previous exchange controls through licenses , a mechanism that had existed
since 1967. Resolutions 55 and 57 authorized banks, financial corporations,
and to some extent savings funds and commercial financing corporations, to
operate as authorized dealers in the exchange market. Article 1.2.4.01 of
resolution 57 stipulated that the more important trade and investment
L operations, including imports, exports , and foreign investment and loans, must
be channelled through the formal exchange market.
The authorized dealers in the market could negotiate foreign exchange
proceeds coming from the activities required to be in the formal market, but
l7 Towards the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993, the liquidation of ECs
forced the monetary authorities to tighten their market operations. The open-
market operations were made through the sale of BR notes.also with currency coming from other activities. Dealers were also authorized
to trade among themselves and with the BR. The transactions, including the
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exchange rates, were to be reported daily to the Banking Superintendent and
the BR. Resolution 55 authorized the BR to intervene in the exchange market
through transaction in ECs , certificates that were denominated in dollars but
payable in pesos. They were freely negotiable and could be liquidated at the
BR before their maturity at a discount rate. It was established that the BR
was not to negotiate dollars with the public, and only to do so by means of
ECS with authorized intermediaries or with the government.
Two measures forced dealers to align their rates with the ER. In order
to sell dollars to the BR, a domestic agent had to buy ECs through a market
dealer. In order to acquire dollars from the BR, the agent had to liquidate
ECs, obtaining them fn the secondary market. As mentioned above, the principal
objective of the new regime was to give more flexibility to the exchange rate,
avoiding the important cost of sterilized intervention. This was the first
step towards a flexible exchange rate, which allows more flexibility in
monetary policy to stop inflationary pressure.
Before the establishment of the EC regime, the BR had centered its
monetary policy on the sterilization of the effects of significant capital
flows coming from abroad. This produced a consistent financial effort for the
BR since the cost of its domestic debt grew continuously in importance.18
Inflation continued unabated as the BR tried to compensate for the observed
real appreciation through a
additional capital inflows.
the devaluation program was
.
, sterilization cycle was too
more aggressive devaluation calendar that induced
By 1991, there was a widespread perception that
not sustainable. The devaluation-intervention-
costly for the BR and the expectations of real
appreciation that ensued generated a more vigorous capital inflow. Exchange
rate flexibility was the only way out of this pervasive cycle.
The EC system produced, in the short term, an effective sterilized
'5 Carrasguilla illustrates with the alarming statistic that the domestic
debt of the Bank grew from 1.5% of GDP in 1989 to 72 in 1991.29
intervention. As domestic agents accumulated their EC stocks, the pressure
concentrated on the exchange market until the floor was reached and pressure
on money creation started. In 1993 though, the ECs started to mature, causing
a new impulse for monetary creation that needed to be sterilized through debt
issues. The EC6 gave some degree of freedun 4.n the short-term, but by no means
monetary policy independence, as it was not a stable sterilization tool. What
appears obvious is that the exchange market was forced to gradually evolve
towards a managed float. The EC's term was an adaptation period, thought to
create the necessary institutional background for the development of the
market. We can observe that domestic open-market operations were the principal
source of sterilization before, during and after the EC system.
More recently the exchange reforms contained in the 21st resolution had
the objective of advancing more quickly than the 57th resolution in
facilitating transactions with international markets. The reforms were
oriented towards speeding up long-term investment flows and to hold out
speculative capital. The reforms applied to the capital market were mainly:
a. Simplification of authorized exchange market operations.
b. Extension of the type of operations not subject to being made through
the formal foreign exchange market.
c. Authorization to make payments for exports and imports in Colombian
pesos.
d. Increase in the possibilities of obtaining loans abroad.
e. Liberalization of capital outflows to foreign markets.
The public debt policy, on the other hand, had as objectives: to
diversify internal financial alternatives, to develop the
. market, to improve the external debt time profile, and to




Consequently, during 1993 and 1994, long-term bonds were issued and placed in
international markets at favorable interest rates, relative to previous
external debt issues. Part of the resources generated were used to prepay
already existing debt.30
The bonds issued were not only the central govetnment's.  About 60% were
issued by public enterprises, including Ecopetrol, the Financiera Electrica
National (FEN) and the Bank of Colombia. This, along with the low
international interest rates, helped to improve the liquidity and solvency of
Colombia's external debt.
p. Reserve Reouirements  and Caoital Account Reuulations
During the second half of the 19808, the Colombian current account
registered a sustained surplus. At the beginning of the 19908, the authorities
reacted to this surplus with trade liberalization measures, consisting mainly
of a reduction of import tariffs , a mix of sterilized interventions to
neutralize the monetary effects of capital inflows, and reserve requirements
to limit the attractiveness of those inflows. A capital account liberalization
in conjunction with tax forgiveness allowed capital repatriation. As a result,
the current account went into deficit and a surplus in the capital account was
created, which increased further in 1992 and 1993, due to relatively low
international interest rates. Net international reserves grew rapidly in 1991
and 1992, but the increase slowed down in 1993 as a result of a reduction in
sterilized foreign exchange intervention.
In 1993, the BR reformed the exchange ordinance, aiming at making
foreign exchange transactions more flexible but at the same time maintaining
some control over speculative capital movements.
In 1993, Article 30 of the 2lst resolution of the BR established a 47%
reserve requirement (RR) on the value of any credit in foreign exchange
obtained by a resident that had a total repayment period of up to 18 months.
The deposits associated with the RR were considered as exchange operations and
were to be made through exchange market intermediaries. Once the RR was
deposited, the BR issued a certificate in exchange that corresponded to the
percentage of the RR multiplied by the amount of the loan. The remaining part
of the loan could enter freely. The certificate was denominated in dollars,
was non-negotiable, had a maturity of one year , and was redeemable at its31
nominal value in pesos at the ER. It was called a "Financial Foreign Currency
Title" (FFCT, Tftulo en Divisas por Financiacionee). The BR could, if
considered necessary, acquire the title8 before their maturity, applying a
discount of 131 over their nominal value at the ER of emission day if the
buyback was performed immediately. If redemption was made on a later date, the
correopondfng ER had to be applied.
In 1994, the reserve requirements were modified allowing for variable RR
according to the maturity of the loan. The 7th resolution of 1994 established
reserve requirements for operations of less than 36 months, the BR giving in
exchange FFCTs with differentiated maturities and rates, with the following









Certificates could be partitioned to the agents' preference, and the BR
could only buy back those with maturity of 12 months, applying a 55% discount
over the ER of the issuance day. Finally the 22nd resolution of 1994
established a new RR schedule extended to maturities of up to 5 years (1,800
days) as can be seen in Annex 1. This shows that in Colombia there is
discrimination against short-run capital inflows; the shorter the maturity,
the higher the RR. The RR is applied for the duration of the operation.
Colombian authorities have attempted to
* , eliminates arbitrage possibilities. The
the arbitrage gap. (Annex 2 proves that
generate a reserve requirement which
RR has been regulated so as to close
under the assumption of flat term
structures of interest rates and expectations of devaluations, the reserve
requirement which eliminates arbitrage increases as the maturity increases.)
The objective was clearly to increase the cost of short-term capital inflows,
in parallel with the liberalization of the capital account.32
fmportant to mention that this system differ8 from that used in
the RR has been oriented toward8 closing the gap of interest rate
rt is
Chile where
arbitrage only for operation8 of
greater uncertainty and risk may
up to one year. For longer maturities, the
act as deterrent to longer-term arbitrage.
D. The Caoital Account and Macroeconomic8
During the 19908, Colombia has experienced significant accumulation of
international reserves, especially at the beginning of the decade. Recently
this behavior has diminished as a consequence of the movement of the current
account from a significant surplus to a deficit. We interpret this behavior as
a result of the international trade liberalization which led to an import  boom
and to a sudden adjustment of the stock of durable consumption goods. We
reject the hypothesis that this behavior was driven by capital inflows.
The surplus in the capital account , which at the beginning of the 19908




interpretation is that the current account deficit
the capital account.
has caused the
respect to the composition of the capital account, there is a
stable trend toward8 an
1 and 2% of GDP.
Capital flows not
increase in PDI. Annual PDI has accounted for between
related to PDI evidenced greater volatility and a
steeper trend growth. Debt flows have increased from 1 to 5% of GDP. Short-
term financing has oscillated around Zero. Some years show an increase in
short-run indebtedness and others show repayment of debts. Colombia has been
more successful than Chile in controlling short run capital inflows. In Chile,
. short-run capital flows represented, on average, 3% of GDP.
In any event it is important to recall that the RR theoretically may not
affect the real exchange rate path. Without an RR, it is quite possible to
obtain the same real exchange rate path but with higher public debt and higher
losses by the Central Bank. Some author8 have argued that the RR is
ineffective. However, the question is how can an authority maintain higher33
interest rates than the rest of the world without increasing public debt to
infinity and without a deep misalignment in the real exchange rate? If the RR
were ineffective, market interest rates should be lower than they are or
public debt would be very high. That capital controls have been effective ie
indicated by the fact that even under high domeetic interest rate8 and low
private disposable income, due to the fimcal murplus and to inflation, there
are no big capital inflows into Colombia. Both Chile and Colombia have managed
to keep high interest rates without an explosive path of public debt.
Moreover, real exchange rate6 have been aligned with fundamentals. This showe
the effectiveness of capital controls.
With respect to macroeconomic performance during the last 5 yearE, the
fiscal sector shows balance, and in some years there are even surpluees.
Despite this fact, inflation has stayed around levels of 20 to 25% a year,
rhowing another caBa of chronic inflation. Despite steady inflation and a
crawling peg eystem with no intervention in the foreign exchange market, there
has not been undue pressure in the foreign exchange market. This also
indicates the effectiveness of capital controls.
The Colombian economy hae maintained a moderate growth record during the
nfnetiea, with a late tendency to acceleration during 1993 and 1994.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, two successful macroeconomic experiences of Latin
American countries during the 1990s have been reviewed. Both countries, Chile
and Colombia, have registered an impressive performance compared to their
. historical record and to the contemporary retaults of other countries in the
region. They have been able to grow on a sustained basis, Chile at an average
rate close to 7% per year, Colombia at around 5%, and have kept their
respective external current account deficit at reasonable levels, Chile below
2% of GDP and Colombia around 3%. The main difference in terma of
macroeconomic performance is that while Chile has succeeded in gradually but
consistently reducing the inflation rate to eingle digits, Colombia maintains34
the trends of the past with a moderate inflation rate between 20 and 25
percent per annum.
The capital account regulations used by both countries can take part of
the credit for the successful macroeconomic performance. Of course, consistent
macroeconomic policies and the right microeconomic incentives are the main
reasons behind this success; however, the macro policies would not have been
possible without effective capital account regulations.
The two polar views in the policy debate on international financial





capital account regulations, like the ones used in Chile and
are ineffective. Some critics argue that the reserve requirements
unable to modify the appreciating trend of the currency,19 and thus
ineffective in favoring
Others argue that the regulations
inflows and reserve accumulation,
a gradual sectoral adjustment process.
have been unable to stop excessive capital
thus 'defending the imposition of
quantitative limits on capital flows. We find both types of criticism
unfounded.
The fact that the appreciating trend of the Chilean currency has
continued at about the same rate after the reserve requirement was introduced
is not an indication of the ineffectiveness of this tool. The reserve
requirement allows for keeping an interest rate differential fn favor of the
emerging economy, without having to generate an expectation of currency
depreciation to fulfil the arbitrage condition. That is to say, the RR is
successful if a once and for all currency appreciation followed by a
depreciating trend is avoided. An appreciating trend could be the result more
' of financial pressures than of a trend in the equilibrium exchange rate; and
more than indicating weaknesses of the RR itself, by being sustained, shows
the strength of the existing capital account regulations, and among them of
the RR.
The effectiveness of the RR is also shown in the change of the
l9 See, for example, S. Valdds (1995).35
composition of net capital inflows. Increasingly, external financing has been
moving from debt into direct investment and equity-based portfolio investment.
This implies a more flexible structure of financing, favoring risk-sharing
between domestic and external partners. It also allows the attainment of
externalities associated with direct investment, in the form of international
market access for exports and the inward transfer of technology and
management. At the same time, medium- and long-term forms of debt have gained
ground and represent increasing proportions of total debt financing.
While there could be leaks in the RR and other regulations, they do not
meem to be of macroeconomic significance. If the leaks were severe, short-term
external financing would be of great importance, but that is not the case
either in Colombia or in Chile. There are periods, however, when short-term
financing is more abundant. These are periods in which the expectations of
currency appreciation are exacerbated. Confronting even a small expected
appreciation in a short period of time is an impossible task  for the RR. The
gains implied by the change in the value of the currency in a few months,
cannot be compensated by the financial cost implied by the RR.
This opens the possibility of using stronger restrictions on capital
flows, quantitative limits for example. In our opinion, quantitative limits
not only create very significant microeconomic costs and slow economic and
financial development, but also most likely would be ineffective. Quantitative
controls would create a dual exchange market. Officially-authorized
transactions would take place at the official rate, and unauthorized capital
flows would be carried out at the parallel market rate, in this case a more
appreciated one. When the exchange rate differential becomes significant, the
incentives for arbitraging between the two exchange markets would increase,
allowing some private operators to make a bundle by buying foreign currency
cheap in the informal market , and selling it at a high price in the formal.
Consider for instance an exporter who would sell and even over-invoice his
proceeds in the official market, but would try to finance every import in the
parallel market. The Central Bank would be forced to accumulate reserves36
purchased at a transitory high exchange rate , and big losses would eventually
accrue when the rate had to be adjusted.
Overall, the RR and other capital account regulations, with their
limitations, have fulfilled a very important role in these two successful.
experiences. Perhapa the problem of the critics is what they expect that the
regulations can provide. They shouldn't ask for more than supporting the
effort to keep the current account deficit within reasonable bounds and at
sustainable levels, while the domestic macroeconomic targets of growth and
price stability are'attained.37
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Annex 1: Colombia: Certificate Maturity and Reserve Requirement Rate.









































































Annex 2: International Arbitrage and Reserve Requirement
l.- Investment and Required Reserves for an Equivalent Period of one Year
(1) (1 + iX1 - El + E U+i*)=  (l+&)
Consider the arbitrage condition that equates the rate of return of domestic and
international financial investment, in this case for an investment with one year maturity and
where the reserve requirement should be kept at the Central Bank for the same period. In
equation (l), i* is the external interest rate, i the domestic interest rate,  E is the reserve
requirement ratio (RR from now on), and  e is the expected depreciation of the domestic
currency. The solution for the RR that fulfii this arbitrage condition, depends on the
international interest rate diierential, on the expected rate of currency depreciation, and on
the level of domestic and external interest rate according to the following exptession:
(2) E ( = i*-i)+8(1+i~)
e-i
2.- Investment and RR for an Equivalent Period of X Months
For an investment of X periods, and when the requirement is kept for the maturity
of the operation, it is possible to obtain an expression similar to (1). The only diierence, is
that the relevant rates are the compound rate for the period in question.
(1 + i*)% =
(l+i)s(l-&)+E
(1 + ep
where we can obtain equivalently to (2);
.
(2’)
E = (1+i*)XX2(1+t)x2 -(l+i)g2
(1+ Qs2 - (1+ i)%
It can be shown that the necessary condition for the RR to increase with the
maturity of the operation, i.e. the partial derivative of E with respect to x to be positive, is





Chile & Colombia 1990-94
(In Percent of GDP)
7.7 9.4 -1.7 12 -03 1.5
35 3.2 0.3 4.2 -2.1 6.3
5.8 7.4 -1.6 2.2 0.0 2.2
1.2 5.7 -4.5 -2.1 2.4 -4.5
6.1 7.5 -1.4 0.3 4.6 -4.3
(a) Balance of Payments surplus over dollar GDP
@) Capital Account ruqlus over dollar GDP
(c) Cm-cat Account mplus over dollar GDP
Source: Authors akulatioas based on data of the Banco Ccntml de Cbilc, Banco de la Rcpdblica de Colombia,
IMP and DANE, Colombia42
Table 2
BOP Capital Account
Chile & Colombia 1990-94
Cln Percent of GDP)
-_ -
20 12 32 1.1
5.9 1.5 -1.8 1.8
3.2 25 0.8 1 .c
(a) Capital Account surplus, except Net Foreign  Diit Iovestroeot  over Dollar GDP.
(b) Net Foreigo Direct Investment over dollar GDP
Some:  Authors calculafioos based oo data of the Banco Cclltral de Chile,  Baoco de la
Repdblica  de Colombia IMF and DANE, Cohbii43
Table 3
Time Structure of Capital
Flows
Chile & Colombia 1990-94
(In Percent of GDP)
(a)Non  Investment medium- aod long-tam  net capital flows over dollar GDP.
(b)Noa Invameot  shrt-term  net capitpl flows over  dollar GDP.
Somcc:Authon~~ondataoftheBancoCcntraldc




Chile & Colombia 1990-94
(Indices, Percent Change and Percent of GDP)
112.8 33 27.3 0.8 9.4
106.4 73 18.7 15 5.4
97.6 11.0 12.7 2.2 5.2
96.9 6.3 12.2 1.9 6.4
I
94.3 1 4.2 I 8.9 I 1.7 1 613
Source: And~ors cakulations  basal on data of the Bpnco Central de Chile, Band de la Rcpdblica de Colombii
IMF and DANE, Colombia,





Chile & Colombia 1990-94
Qn Percent of GDP)
18.5 18.9 -1.5 -0.4
15.9 18.6 -6.3 -2.7 -
17.2 17.0 -2.2 0.2
20.4 “. 4.5 ..*
. . . . . . 4.3 . . .
(a) Total Investmeat  (gross K formation aud inventory accumulation) over GDP.
(b) National Savings over GDP
(c) External  Savings, or current account deficit over GDP.
(c’) Nor~domcstic  savings, defined as the ratio0 of invcsancnt  ivcr GDP minus domestic saving over GDP.
Soura: Authors calculations based oo data of tbc Banco Central de Chile. Banco de la Repablica de Colombia,
Ih4F and DANE, Colombia